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McDONALD’S PARADOXICAL LEGACY:  
STATE RESTRICTIONS OF NON-CITIZENS’ GUN RIGHTS 
DAVID S. COHEN∗
The gun rights movement could not have found a better plaintiff 
than Eoin Pryal to challenge Massachusetts’ citizenship requirement 
for possessing firearms.  Pryal is a citizen of the United Kingdom, 
where he was a rifleman in the British Territorial Army and obtained 
both a shotgun certificate and international dealer’s license, which 
allowed him to travel internationally with his own weapon for hunt-
ing.
  
1  Now a lawful permanent resident of the United States living in 
Massachusetts, Pryal is an assistant firearms instructor at the Massa-
chusetts Firearm School and a customer service representative at a lo-
cal firearms manufacturer.2  Christopher Fletcher joined Pryal as a 
plaintiff in the challenge.3  Fletcher, also a lawful permanent resident, 
had lived in the United States for over fifteen years and had com-
pleted firearms safety courses in both California and Massachusetts.4
Pryal and Fletcher sued Massachusetts for their right to own and 
possess firearms, claiming that the state’s prohibition on lawful per-
manent residents owning and possessing firearms conflicted with the 
right found in the Second Amendment.
 
5  Relying on the Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller6 and McDonald 
v. City of Chicago,7
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 the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts ruled that the Second Amendment’s individual right to 
possess a gun for self-defense, which the Supreme Court found in Hel-
* Associate Professor of Law, Earle Mack School of Law at Drexel University.  Thank 
you to Stephanie Huffnagle for excellent and speedy research assistance and Krysten Con-
non for incredibly valuable overall feedback. 
 1. Fletcher v. Haas, No. 11-10644-DPW, 2012 WL 1071713, at ∗2 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 
2012). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at ∗1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  Massachusetts is not alone in restricting non-citizens’ access to guns.  See general-
ly Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, Federal Power, and the Second 
Amendment, 92 IOWA L. REV. 891, 895 & nn.11–14 (2007) (summarizing state restrictions 
on non-citizens’ access to guns). 
 6. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 7. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
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ler and incorporated against the states in McDonald, protected a lawful 
permanent resident’s right to bear arms8 and that the Massachusetts 
statutory scheme with respect to non-citizens violated that right.9  The 
district court found that the Second Amendment applies to non-
citizens because the court read McDonald as incorporating the Second 
Amendment through the Due Process Clause, which protects against 
states infringing on the rights of “persons.”10
However, the court erred when it ignored the voting paradox 
within the McDonald decision.  In fact, because of the voting paradox 
in McDonald, determining how to apply McDonald in a case such as 
Pryal and Fletcher’s is a complex endeavor.
 
11  Here, I attempt to re-
solve McDonald’s paradox in the context of non-citizens by applying a 
modification of the familiar rule for dealing with fragmented Su-
preme Court opinions.  Under that modified rule, there is no basis 
for finding that the Second Amendment, applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects non-citizens from gun 
restrictions.  There may be other reasons to find that states cannot re-
strict non-citizens from owning or possessing firearms,12
I.  THE VOTING PARADOX IN MCDONALD v. CITY OF CHICAGO 
 but based on 
Supreme Court precedent, incorporation of a fundamental right is 
not one of them. 
McDonald v. City of Chicago is an example of a voting paradox.13
 
 8. Fletcher, 2012 WL 1071713, at ∗8, ∗13. 
  
The issue before the Court in McDonald was whether the individual 
 9. Id. at ∗14. 
 10. Id. at ∗8 (“The Supreme Court . . . chose the option of protecting Second Amend-
ment rights under the Due Process clause and eschewed deployment of the Privileges and 
Immunities clause, which is limited to citizens.”); see also State v. Ibrahim, 269 P.3d 292, 
297 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that incorporated Second Amendment rights protect 
non-citizens). 
 11. Whether, in evaluating federal restrictions on non-citizens’ access to guns, the 
Second Amendment itself applies directly to non-citizens is a separate issue outside the 
scope of this Essay.  See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citi-
zenship and the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521 (2010). 
 12. See, e.g., Ibrahim, 269 P.3d at 297 (acknowledging that the state’s constitution guar-
anteed the right to bear arms); People v. Bounasri, 915 N.Y.S.2d 921, 922–23 (N.Y. City Ct. 
2011) (relying on the Equal Protection Clause to analyze a statute prohibiting a non-
citizen’s possession of a weapon). 
 13. See generally David S. Cohen, The Paradox of McDonald v. City of Chicago, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 823, 825–30 (2011) (explaining that a “‘voting paradox’ occurs when the 
Court issues a decision with splintered opinions, such as McDonald, and the resulting 
groups of Justices are split such that the outcome of the case is the opposite of the out-
come that should arise from the majority’s resolution of the controlling issues” and con-
cluding that McDonald constituted a voting paradox within this framework). 
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right to own and possess guns, which the Supreme Court found in 
Heller to be protected under the Second Amendment, was incorpo-
rated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.14  The 
Court concluded, by a 5-4 margin, that the Fourteenth Amendment 
does incorporate the Second Amendment against the states.15
However, underneath the surface of this straightforward out-
come lies a voting paradox that complicates the question of whether 
states can restrict the gun rights of non-citizens.  The voting paradox 
arose because the five Justices who voted to incorporate the Second 
Amendment against the states could not agree on the basis of incor-
poration.  Justice Alito, writing the plurality opinion for himself and 
three others, found that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment individual gun 
right.
  In that 
sense, McDonald was very clear, and the Chicago prohibition on hand-
gun ownership at issue in McDonald violated this constitutional pro-
tection. 
16  Justice Thomas, who was the fifth vote for incorporation, took 
a different route.  Instead of relying on the Due Process Clause, Jus-
tice Thomas found that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorpo-
rated the Second Amendment gun right.17  Importantly, Justice Alito’s 
opinion rejected the Privileges or Immunities theory,18 and Justice 
Thomas’s opinion rejected the Due Process theory.19  Because the two 
dissenting opinions each rejected both theories,20
 
 a voting paradox 
arose.  The following chart illustrates the paradox: 
 
 14. The Second Amendment, like all of the Bill of Rights, directly applies only to the 
federal government and its territories.  See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 
(1833) (concluding that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government and not 
the states).  Only through the doctrine of incorporation do the principles of the Second 
Amendment apply to state and local governments.  See generally McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 
3028–36 (Alito, J., plurality opinion) (discussing the history of incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights and theories about the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 15. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026. 
 16. Id. at 3050. 
 17. Id. at 3088 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 18. Id. at 3030–31 (Alito, J., plurality opinion). 
 19. Id. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 20. Id. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality that the meaning of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause is “not nearly as clear as it would need to be to dis-
lodge 137 years of precedent”); id. at 3119 (analyzing incorporation of the right to bear 
arms on Due Process Clause grounds and asserting that “the Second Amendment does not 
apply to the States”); id. at 3132 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality opi-
nion’s refusal to revisit the Privileges or Immunities Clause); id. at 3136 (rejecting the Due 
Process Clause as an avenue for incorporation of the Second Amendment). 
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Opinion 
author 
(number of 
Justices 
joining 
opinion) 
Does the Due 
Process Clause 
incorporate? 
Does the 
Privileges or 
Immunities 
Clause 
incorporate? 
Is the Second 
Amendment 
incorporated? 
Alito (4) Yes (4) No (4) Yes (4) 
Thomas (1) No (1) Yes (1) Yes (1) 
Stevens (1) No (1) No (1) No (1) 
Breyer (3) No (3) No (3) No (3) 
Total  No (5-4) No (8-1) Yes (5-4) 
 
The bottom line of the chart illustrates why this case is a voting 
paradox and not just a run-of-the-mill split opinion.  As the tallies in-
dicate, majorities of the Court rejected each of the two theories of in-
corporation for the Second Amendment gun right.  Five Justices re-
jected incorporation through the Due Process Clause (Justice Thomas 
and the four dissenters), and eight Justices rejected incorporation 
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause (Justice Alito and the 
three Justices who joined him in his plurality opinion along with the 
four dissenters).  Nonetheless, five Justices held that the Second 
Amendment was incorporated.  Thus, the case presents a paradox: 
the right is incorporated, but majorities of the Court rejected each 
theory of incorporation.21
II.  WHEN THE VOTING PARADOX MATTERS 
 
For Otis McDonald, the United States citizen challenging the 
Chicago handgun ban, the voting paradox led to a favorable out-
come.  The difference in the two theories was irrelevant, as both theo-
ries of incorporation applied the Second Amendment right to him.  
However, because of a textual difference between the two clauses, the 
underlying disagreement that led to the voting paradox matters for 
non-citizens like Eoin Pryal and Christopher Fletcher. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states 
that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or proper-
 
 21. For a more detailed description of the McDonald paradox, see generally Cohen, 
supra note 13. 
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ty, without due process of law.”22  Although the Bill of Rights techni-
cally applies only to the federal government,23 longstanding Supreme 
Court precedent has used the Due Process Clause as the vehicle for 
applying almost all, though not every one, of the rights protected by 
the Bill of Rights to the states.24
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment states that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”
 
25  Very soon after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, 
the Supreme Court limited the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s ef-
fect, holding that it protected only a small set of rights that “owe their 
existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Con-
stitution, or its laws.”26  Scholars have long criticized the Supreme 
Court for almost completely eviscerating the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause and have suggested that the Clause was a better way to incor-
porate the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.27  Although Justice 
Black supported this idea when he was on the Court,28 it never gained 
traction with a majority of Justices.29
Nonetheless, the attorneys for McDonald strongly urged the 
Court to breathe new life into the Privileges or Immunities Clause by 
incorporating the Second Amendment through this Clause.
 
30
 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
  As 
noted above, Justice Alito’s plurality opinion rejected this plea, relying 
on the traditional method of incorporation through the Due Process 
 23. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833) (explaining that the 
question of whether the Bill of Rights applied to the states “is, we think, of great impor-
tance, but not of much difficulty” and that it did not). 
 24. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (cataloguing rights from the Bill 
of Rights that courts have applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
holding in favor of incorporation of the right to a jury trial). 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 26. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1872). 
 27. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights 
Against States?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 444 (1996) (explaining that as a matter of 
ordinary language, and according to its plain meaning at the time of its adoption, the Pri-
vileges or Immunities Clause is an obvious mechanism for incorporating the Bill of 
Rights). 
 28. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 166 (Black, J., concurring) (“I suggest that any reading of ‘pri-
vileges or immunities of citizens of the United States’ which excludes the Bill of Rights’ 
safeguards renders the words of this section of the Fourteenth Amendment meaning-
less.”). 
 29. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 728 (6th ed. 2009) (explain-
ing that the Court has generally rendered the Privileges or Immunities Clause super-
fluous). 
 30. Brief for Petitioners at 9–65, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) 
(No. 08-1521). 
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Clause.31  However, Justice Thomas agreed with McDonald’s attorneys 
and wrote an opinion rejecting Due Process incorporation and adopt-
ing Privileges or Immunities incorporation.32
Although the result for McDonald was the same regardless of the 
method of incorporation, there are two important substantive differ-
ences between relying on the Due Process Clause and the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.  First, the rights protected under the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause may differ from the rights protected under the 
Due Process Clause.  For instance, Justice Thomas was partially moti-
vated to rely on the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the 
Due Process Clause because of his belief that the Due Process Clause 
had been the basis for Roe v. Wade,
 
33 a decision that, presumably, his 
understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause would not 
countenance.34  Also, as noted above, when he was on the Court, Jus-
tice Black argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorpo-
rated all of the Bill of Rights, which the Due Process Clause did not.35  
Furthermore, scholars on both ends of the political spectrum see the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause as possibly protecting new rights, with 
scholars on the left suggesting that the Clause may protect rights to 
education, health care, and other liberal concerns, and scholars on 
the right theorizing that the Clause may protect rights to contract, 
property, and other economic concerns.36
Second, and more importantly for Eoin Pryal and Christopher 
Fletcher, the clauses differ in their scope of who is protected.  While 
the Due Process Clause protects “any person,” the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause refers to rights held by “citizens.”
 
37  Thus, longstand-
ing precedent has applied the Due Process Clause to non-citizens with 
a sufficient connection to the United States.38
 
 31. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Alito, J., plurality opi-
nion). 
  In contrast, although 
 32. Id. at 3062–88 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 34. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (arguing that the Court has used the Due Process Clause to apply rights against 
states that are not mentioned in the Constitution “without seriously arguing that the 
Clause was originally understood to protect such rights” and referring to Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 35. Compare Duncan, 391 U.S. at 166 (Black, J., concurring), with id. at 148–49 (White, 
J., majority opinion). 
 36. See generally Dale E. Ho, Dodging a Bullet: McDonald v. City of Chicago and the Limits 
of Progressive Originalism, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 369, 390–95, 407–14 (2010). 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 38. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (referring to the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendments as “universal in their application, 
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some scholars have suggested that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause’s reference to “citizens” is merely a description of the type of 
substantive rights protected and not a reference to who is protected,39 
most agree that the word “citizens” is a limitation on who can gain the 
protection from the Clause.40
III.  A PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF THE PARADOX 
  Thus, Pryal and Fletcher, both lawful 
permanent residents and not citizens of the United States, would be 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause but 
would not be protected by the same Amendment’s Privileges or Im-
munities Clause.  If there had been a majority in McDonald for one 
method of incorporation over the other, the answer to Pryal and 
Fletcher’s claim would be clear; however, because of the voting para-
dox, the resolution is anything but. 
The voting paradox raises many troubling issues about appellate 
decision making.  Most of the concerns about the voting paradox re-
late to the process and legitimacy of appellate decision making, such 
as whether the judges have manipulated the outcome of the case, 
whether litigants have gamed the system, and whether the result is fair 
given the apparent resolutions of the sub-issues.41
The settled Supreme Court rule for handling the precedential 
value of plurality opinions comes from Marks v. United States.
  However, there is 
also an issue related to how subsequent courts should apply the para-
doxical decision. 
42
 
to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of . . . 
nationality”). 
  In that 
case, the Court spelled out the method for determining which part of 
a fragmented decision is considered precedent for future cases.  The 
 39. See Ho, supra note 36, at 405–06.  
 40. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1193, 1222 (1992) (“Can we really say that the Bill’s ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’ are truly 
privileges and immunities of ‘citizens of the United States?’ Of course we can.”); Richard 
A. Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 334, 341 (2005) (“The more dubious position of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is that it accepted the preferred position of citizens relative to 
outsiders, by denying to the latter the privileges and immunities afforded to citizens.”). 
 41. See generally David S. Cohen, The Precedent-Based Voting Paradox, 90 B.U. L. REV. 183, 
224–31 (2010); David G. Post & Steven C. Salop, Issues and Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeter-
minacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (1996); John 
M. Rogers, “Issue Voting” by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response to Some Radical Proposals, 
49 VAND. L. REV. 997, 999 (1996); Maxwell L. Stearns, How Outcome Voting Promotes Prin-
cipled Issue Identification: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1045, 
1050 (1996). 
 42. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
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Court explained that the narrowest opinion that supports the out-
come of the case is binding precedent for future cases.43  For instance, 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke44 contains fragmented 
opinions that Marks helps resolve.  Although a majority of the Court 
held that the medical school’s affirmative action plan was not lawful, 
there were three separate groupings of Justices.45  The four-Justice 
plurality opinion would have prohibited almost all affirmative action 
plans.46  Justice Powell’s concurring opinion took a narrower position, 
as he found that the medical school’s plan was not lawful but would 
have allowed some affirmative action plans.47  The four-Justice dissent 
would have permitted affirmative action at the medical school and in 
most instances.48  Thus, Justice Powell’s concurrence became future 
binding precedent because it was the narrowest opinion that sup-
ported the outcome of the case.49
Maxwell Stearns has explained the theoretical basis for this me-
thod of determining the controlling opinion when the Court has no 
clear majority: “If we were to plot each of the published opinions [] 
along a [single issue] continuum, from broadest [] to narrowest[], we 
could derive the Court’s implicit consensus position.”
   
50
As McDonald is a fragmented opinion, Marks seems like the ap-
propriate rule to apply to determine what the precedent is for future 
cases.  However, as I have explained elsewhere, Marks cannot solve the 
  In Bakke, the 
opinions address one issue, whether affirmative action is lawful, so 
both the dissent and the plurality would prefer the middle-ground 
approach taken by Justice Powell to the approach taken by the oppo-
site opinion. 
 
 43. Id. at 193 (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale ex-
plaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (Ste-
wart, J.))).  For an excellent, thorough explanation of the Marks rule, see Maxwell L. 
Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 
CONST. COMMENT. 321 (2000). 
 44. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 45. Id. at 271–72 (Powell, J., judgment of the Court). 
 46. Id. at 416, 421 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
 47. Id. at 314–15 (Powell, J., judgment of the Court). 
 48. Id. at 324–26 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 49. This discussion of Bakke simplifies the opinions for the sake of analysis.  For a fuller 
discussion of the application of Marks to Bakke, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION 
MAKING 130–33 (2000). 
 50. Id. at 127. 
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mystery of what precedent comes from McDonald.51  The opinions in 
McDonald contain multiple issues—whether the Due Process Clause 
incorporates and whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause incor-
porates.52  Thus, unlike in Bakke, there is no natural ordering of opi-
nions from broadest to narrowest.  For instance, in one respect, Jus-
tice Alito’s opinion is broader than Justice Thomas’s opinion because, 
as mentioned above, the Due Process Clause applies to “any person” 
whereas the Privileges or Immunities Clause applies to “citizens.”53  
However, in another way, Justice Thomas’s opinion is possibly broad-
er than Justice Alito’s opinion because the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause could incorporate all of the Bill of Rights, which the Due 
Process Clause does not,54 and could also include other substantive 
rights that have not been found under the Due Process Clause, such 
as economic or social justice rights.55  In theory, Justice Thomas’s Pri-
vileges or Immunities Clause could cover fewer rights than the Due 
Process Clause, but Marks does not leave the controlling opinion 
analysis to guesswork.  “Rather, the answer comes by looking to which 
rationale is logically entailed by broader reasoning.  In McDonald, the 
analysis described in Marks is unhelpful because the rationales [ad-
dress multiple issues].”56
Though Marks cannot answer the question of which opinion is 
the general controlling opinion from McDonald, a modified form of 
the Marks rule could solve the problem of how to apply a decision in-
volving a voting paradox.  Rather than looking for the narrowest opi-
nion that supports the outcome of the case, which is an impossible 
task in a case involving a voting paradox,
 
57 the modified Marks rule 
would look for the narrowest opinion that supports the outcome of 
the case with respect to the issue presented in the future case.58
Thus, consider a future case that addresses the question whether 
the Third Amendment is incorporated, something the Supreme 
Court has yet to resolve.
 
59
 
 51. See Cohen, supra note 
  As the issue in the case would be what subs-
13, at 832–33. 
 52. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text. 
 53. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
 54. See, e.g., Hutardov v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (finding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not incorporate the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury right). 
 55. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 56. See Cohen, supra note 13, at 833 n.58. 
 57. See generally STEARNS, supra note 49, at 134–35 (discussing situations in which Marks 
does not work). 
 58. See Rogers, supra note 41, at 1008 (describing a similar solution to the Marks prob-
lem for voting paradoxes). 
 59. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.13. 
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tantive rights are incorporated, Justice Thomas’s opinion would most 
likely be the broadest because the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
would, presumably, incorporate all rights under the Bill of Rights.60  
Justice Alito’s opinion would be narrower, as the Due Process Clause 
does not incorporate all rights under the Bill of Rights, only those 
that are fundamental.61
The opposite would result on the issue of who is guaranteed the 
incorporated right.  That is exactly the issue in Pryal and Fletcher’s 
case—whether non-citizens are protected from state infringements on 
the right to gun ownership.  The case is not about the content of the 
gun right, as that was decided in Heller.  The case is not about whether 
states are bound to respect the right for citizens, as that was decided 
in McDonald.  Rather, the case is precisely about who, beyond citizens, 
is guaranteed the protection of the incorporated right.  On this point, 
Justice Alito’s opinion would be the broadest opinion, as Due Process 
incorporation guarantees the right to “any person.”  Justice Thomas’s 
opinion, most likely the broadest opinion with respect to the content 
of what rights are incorporated, is now the narrower opinion, as the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects a subset of “any person”—
“citizens.”  Therefore, under the modified Marks rule, Justice Tho-
mas’s opinion would control on this issue.  And under that opinion, 
Pryal and Fletcher would not prevail in their claim to strike down 
Massachusetts’ restriction on non-citizen gun possession because the 
right is not incorporated for non-citizens. 
  Therefore, under the modified Marks rule, 
Justice Alito’s opinion would control the outcome in the later case. 
This modified Marks rule makes analytic and theoretical sense.  
Using the issue of non-citizen gun ownership as illustrative, because 
the dissent rejects incorporation of the gun right in any form, there 
are four votes against incorporating the right for non-citizens.  Add-
ing Justice Thomas’s vote, which does not incorporate the right for 
non-citizens, to those four gives a majority of five votes.  The modified 
Marks rule, looking just at the issue presented in this future case, al-
lows us to isolate the votes in this way.  It also allows us to view a case 
containing multiple issues as having just one issue.  Viewing the case 
in that way, the Marks rule can address the problem because judicial 
preferences regarding that one issue can be arrayed from broadest to 
narrowest. 
 
 60. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
 61. See id. at 148–49 (majority opinion). 
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This modified rule is not perfect.62  The rule resembles tea-leaf 
reading, a practice that is unreliable at best.  Further, the rule does 
not necessarily accurately capture the embedded but unknown prefe-
rences of the individual Justices.  For instance, despite arguing against 
it in his opinion, Justice Thomas may actually prefer Due Process in-
corporation for “any person” to no incorporation at all, in which case 
that option would prevail against the option of no incorporation for 
non-citizens.63
However, despite these imperfections, the modified Marks rule 
might be the best option for determining how to apply a Supreme 
Court decision that contains a voting paradox.  Lower courts need 
guidance when addressing cases before them that require resolution, 
and this proposed rule can give some, as there is otherwise no 
straightforward way to use a paradoxical decision given current proto-
cols for determining precedential value.  Moreover, the modified rule 
appears to make analytical and theoretical sense while approaching 
new claims cautiously.  After all, without a majority of the Court 
adopting a position on a particular issue, it makes no sense for a lower 
court to determine that it is bound by a minority position. 
  Finally, given the nature of the paradox, the modified 
Marks rule would always result in a denial of a claim because the dis-
senting votes would always add with one of the opinions supporting 
the outcome to create a majority denying the claim. 
IV.  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The fragmented opinions in McDonald do not help Eoin Pryal 
and Christopher Fletcher’s Second Amendment claim.  Contrary to 
how the district court analyzed McDonald,64
 
 62. Cf. STEARNS, supra note 
 there is no reasonable way 
to conclude that the case stands for the proposition that non-citizens’ 
individual gun rights are protected against state infringement.  Ra-
ther, because of the voting paradox in the case, lower courts cannot 
apply McDonald beyond the specific context of that case: a citizen’s 
claim that a state has infringed on her Second Amendment gun own-
ership right.  Here, I have shown that a modified version of the famil-
iar Marks rule, though not without its drawbacks, has analytical and 
theoretical appeal and, at the very least, gives lower courts something 
49, at 140–41 (discussing some of the problems with tally-
ing votes on a per-issue basis when one issue arises independently). 
 63. Justice Thomas’s second preference in this hypothetical scenario would combine 
with the first preference of Justice Alito’s plurality to form a majority over the dissent’s 
preference for no incorporation. 
 64. Fletcher v. Haas, No. 11-10644-DPW, 2012 WL 1071713, at ∗8 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 
2012). 
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to work with.  It does not, however, give Pryal or Fletcher, or any oth-
er non-citizen, a winning Second Amendment claim. 
But all is not lost for non-citizens and gun rights.  As some courts 
have held, the Equal Protection Clause can form the basis of a viable 
claim,65 as might state constitutions.66
 
 65. See, e.g., People v. Bounasri, 915 N.Y.S.2d 921, 922–23 (N.Y. City Ct. 2011). 
  However, because of the voting 
paradox in McDonald, the incorporated Second Amendment claim 
does not protect non-citizens such as Eoin Pryal and Christopher 
Fletcher. 
 66. See, e.g., State v. Ibrahim, 269 P.3d 292, 297 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
